








AN ANALYSIS OF MILITARY BUDGETING'
PAUL P. Pi: m
V- £ ''.';',''•' •'' ,'' <<'
XmmL ."••'
lifflliHnHlilHf


























Captain, U. I. Marine Corp©
Bachelor of Science! in £conc*aies
itsg
Villanova College
A thesis submitted to the faculty of the School of Government, Business and
International Affairs of The George Washington University in partial




Arlln Sex Johnson, Ph. D.















£eorganination of Fiscal lianageEaent in the
National Security Act Araeacfoents of 1949)




xxx. vausam vomsMnm ie
Objectives
Program Structure









Budget Review within the Havy Deparaneat

TABLE OF CONTENTS CONT'D.
Chapter Page
V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROGRAM CHANGE CONTROL SYSTEM 48
General









1. Major Organization Units and Appropriation
Titles—Department of the Navy 10
2. Preparation, Submission and Execution
of the Budget 15
3. Grose Requirements Matrix—'End FY 1965 25
4. Acquisition Matrix—FY 1965 26
5. The Budget by Program, FY 1963—
Department of the Navy 32
6* Summary of Budget Plan—by Program and
Appropriation, FY 1963
Department of the Navy 34
7. Review Process in Navy, FY 1964 44
iv

k national budget system was established in 1921. However, little
progress was accomplished in the military budget process until the passage of
Public Law 81-216 (Title IV of the national Security Act /kaendments of 1949),
almost thirty years later. Since that time the progress made in the kidget
process of the military might he coshered to the gathering momentum of a
snowball rolling down a steep hill. The era since the end of World ^ar II,
has been a period of reform with particular emphasis on the financial
management and the budget process* The most noticeable impact on the budgeting
process has taken place since Robert 3. McUarasra has been Secretary of Defease.
Through his Program Changs Control System, he has added flexibility to the
Department of Defense's financial management and dccision*makiiig process*
The objective of this thesis is first, to trace the evaluation of the
military budget process since the establishment of the national budget system
in 1921, with particular omphasis being placed on the present day system. A
second objective is to analyse the present day system. The last objective is

2personally to become knowledgeable in the military budget process.
The method of research has been indirect. The majority of data have
teen compiled from books, public documents » articles, periodicals, and
reports in the field of budgeting.
i
Numerous personal interviews were conducted <s/ith Colonel Kenneth C.
Houston, U. $t Marine Corps, office of the Comptroller, Department of the Jtevy.
Bis technical knowledge and assistance in the preparation of this thesis have
been a guide and an inspiration throughout this research.

CHAP3EE X
From the enactment of the Budgeting and Accountlag Ace of 1921 > which
eetebliahed a national budget system, until the latter part of the 1940* a,
military budgeta x*ere baaed on objects of expenditure and organisational
units. Xt was not until after World tfar XX, that the military as well as
other government departments and agencies began to show progress in relation
to the budgetary process.
In 1946, the Navy Department submitted its budget for fiscal year
1948 in two alternate forms* One van submitted in the traditional way based
on Bevy appropriations; the other form was prepared on a program basis.
Both of these budgets were submitted to the Congress; however, both the
Senate and the House of Representatives appropriation committees rejected
the budget baaed on programs.
Mot until the passage of the national Security Act of 1947, did the
Importance of the budget in the military come into focus. From the newly
lFrederick C. Mosher, Program jfrq^et^fit foeory and, foact^ca,, (Hew Tork
American Book-Stratford Press, Inc., 19S4), p. 80.
3

established post of Secretary of Defense, Jamea Forrestal, used his Influence
to push for a reorganisation of the appropriation structure along the program
basis.
Forrestal'e problems during late 1947 and more
particularly during 1946 In preparing and presenting
an integrated defense budget have had considerable
significance in the development of unification as well
as in recent budgeting in the Defense Department. The
open appeals by the Mr Force for more than the Defense
Department had approved for it; the later requests by the
Army for more than the Defense Department had approved
for it; the passing by Congress of appropriations above
Presidential requests for the Air Force and the President's
subsequent impounding of appropriated funds—ail these
attest to the significance of the budget .2
First Hoover Commission
During this turbulent period, a task force was engaged by the (Hoover)
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government to study
the organisation and operation established by the Rational Security Act of
1947. This task force stressed the importance of investing greater authority
in the Secretary of Defense over the budgets and expenditures of the
recommendations which the task force had made, with the exception of
recommending the establishment of comptrollers in the Defense Department and
individual services, the Ccaaaiasion also recommended that the Secretary of
mm*m**+t *******
M
m*mmmmB**mim»m»+mwn\imv imwm»wm<mmimm*mmmum\m *m**«*m*mtitMimmm*mrmi » mmmmmmwm*m*mim* tpmmmm*m**'wmm*m*mm »m*mi»mmmmm*m *\inMwm»m*m&mmmmmm*"mmmm\it
llbU, , p. 30.
'
Tf fijftffa* « p. 32,

5Defense lie given full and final authority, subject only to the authority of
the President, over the budgets of the individual service© as well as their
expenditures as appropriated by the Congress.
IliillftMllffilUI^I^/
As a result of the reports generated by the task force and the
Soever Camaission, President frustae reeonsiended to the Congress changes to
the national Security Act of 1947. fhe Senate Costaittee en Armed Services
drafted a bill which incorporated President Truman* s recommendations and after
being renusabered md ataeadad, title Vf was added to the National Security Act
of 1947, h^ Public Law 31*216 as a new title, this new title was established
to create efficiency and economy in the JQejsartsaent of Befense by reorganising
a. turn** ********* i« *. **»«•.»
More specifically, Title tff
1. frovided for the establislsaent of a Ctaaptroller for
the Office of the Secretary of Defease and e Controller in
each of the three military Sq^taneats, in order that there
assy be an organised effort to carry out these objectives.
2, Directed that a perfor53aace*type budget be adapted
by the Department of Safesse with a segregation ef operating
smd capital programs.
-
mm » «H.—mHmMm—n.l«i ! mm i n W i unm iin ilnl ini ii n. i n.li H i»H . pn m »«. in i,» I n m l mil——»»»««—»m»m il . i n—li.li J i ii t lummm.»*m* I m I n i «iii»iil»i .1'
»
m» i n »
l
ilM«» PP- 32-42.
V. S. Congress* Senate* Gaonlttee on Cbvemsaent Operations, Financial
Wmmffiit fa PM.'MQml 9?wmm%> Senate ©ocmaenfc Ho. 11, 67th Congress,
1st Session (Washington: Govemroeat Printing Office, 1961), pp. 75*76.

63y enacting Public Law 216, the Congress directed & performance-type
budget for the entire Department of Defense. Prior to this time, the
Congress had appropriated billions upon billions of dollars without knowing
what the Money was being used for or why,
Zn the Army, for instance separate budgeta were submitted
for each of the technical servicesj the Quartermaster Corps,
the Tranaportation Service, Ordnance Service and Supplier, and
so forth. These separate budgets could not be related to the
security objectives of the country without a knowledge of
interrelationships within the Array that even the most experienced
military expert: would find it: difficult to command. The best
reviewers could do would be to compare the budget for a particular
service with the record for the preceding year and raise
questions about increases.
The performance budget was a significant lisprovesaent over the old
"objects** type budget. Iwsever, the performance budget fell short of
identifying the budget based upon functions, activities and project© as
called for by the Hoover Commission, the budget classification did not show
how much It coats to maintain the strategic strike, force, how such it costs
to defend the country fson surprise attack* how mich it costs to maintain
the country's airborne capability, etc.
As Jesse Surkhaad states,
Performance classification in and of itself d^i&B not assure
store desirable ^wrnment programs at a lower cost, although
this is frequently Implied in discussions of the subject. At
best* performance classification provides factual evidence
which may be of assistance to all levels of management ta
determining effectiveness. Perfotisance data, when properly
grouped in relation to larger programs, can also be of
assistance to legislators and citizens as they select desirable
««—».l »'ll'Ji||« l »iHl «|I|»IH»I»II ' I I llllll HH I KHM III » 1 1111,11 . H I H I |> l I .HIJ .1 I.I P» >|W| «|l II I I I III! I l l I I I I I 1 1 1 II I l lli . II H I I Ill I I I I l« I' W ill i HI ! Il l ll ll«' «" I »l M ill il Ml H i I .II I
lArthur Smithies, ftftMmm *WPm> <ft flftft ,WK# ,^» <to *ork:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1055), pp. 232-2-

gpvamaent activities asd progreas, mttommom
classification am point up the concrete chiags $®m sod
the dollar cost of thesa, but tine value judgnsnts about
the© are saada ia the politic raiad»~aad, for society, la tins
political process*
1Jesse BurMiead, (Hffimm, JBtoftfffcltoft £*^ Torks Jofm ^ilsy & Soas,




After the Congresa pm**4 tattle Urn 2U (Title IW-ifetional Security
;» it took the services until 1953 to cwtka the change*
in their racenatruction to the
procedure by the outbreak of hostilities in Korea,
As Frederick C. Moahcr states, "The first, and probably to date the
of the perfoewanc© budget
of classifications baaed on functions, second, m,® the reconstruction of
ag*s>roj»riati©»s, and lastly was the devalofsaeat of a#$*roprletions based on
projects, activities and functions as contrasted with appropriations, baaed
on obiects of esraiefi&iturea and or&aaisj&tionai unite.
*Hoahar t p* S3.

9As a result of this movement toward a pcr£ormaac&»type budget, the
Hevy reduced the number el its appropriations from 32 to 21 titles end
eventually to 13 J the Arsgr reduced the ras&er of its appropriations from 21
to Si end the Air Force system incorporated nine appropriation titles*
the Army end Air Force appropriation titles were somewhat similar
when coopered to the Usvy's system which was built around its bureau system
of organization, in which each bureau was given jurisdiction ever one or
more than one appropriation* Figure I shows the major appropriation title
along with the units which had responsibility over these titles.*
As can be seen from the appropriation titles of the Air Force, the
difference between the Air Force and the Havy's appropriation structure is
$uite apparent. The appropriation titles of the Air Force are:
Aircraft and delated Procurement
Major Procurement Other Than Aircraft
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Major Organisation Units and Appropriation Titles,
a
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Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
Bureau of "Sards and Dock*
Office of Savai Ifceseareh
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts
Office of Chief of Hsval
Operations
Office of the Secretary of
the Ifcrvy
Military Personnel, Havy
Military Personnel, Havel Reserve
Military Personnel, Officer Candidates
Kavy Personnel, General Expenses
Military Personnel, Marine Corps
Military Personnel, Marine Corps Seserve
Marine Corps Troops and Facilities
Aircraft and Facilities










Service"*wi4a Supply and Finance
Service*wlde Operations (Activities 1
through 7a)
Servlce<*wide Operations (Activities 7c
through 12)
Operations and Conversion of Haval
Petroleum Reserves
Haval Petroleum Eeserva J&aabered 4, Alaska
a
rrederick t, kosher, mmm Mmjum, Hfomvf §# g«to
American Bo©Je-&tratford Press, Inc., 1954), p. 86,
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Xn order to have a common denominator oil which to compare and
evaluate the budgets of the individual services, the Department of Defease
directed the three military departments to submit their budget estimates
baaed ©a a standard classification of basic coat categories, These categories
are ftindamentally similar to the appropriation structure of the Army and
X
Air Force general staff activity, they are*
Military Personnel
Operation and Maintenance
Major Procurement and Production Costa





Since the establishment of categories of the Defense classification,
the Bavy reduced the number of Its appropriation titles to 13* these
appropriations are divided into 'annual appropriations" sad "continuing
appropriations, 5 ' 2be titles of these 13 appropriations are as fallows:







Military Personnel, Marine Corps
Reserve Personnel, Navy
Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps
Operations and Maintenance, Navy
Operatious and Maintenance, Marine Corps
Confcfoiufofi Appropriations
Aircraft and Eelated Procurement , Navy
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
Procurement of Ordnance and Amounition, Navy
Procurement, Marine Corps
Research, development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy
Military Construction, Navy
Military Construction, Naval Reserve
. i . maintenance and operations, minor procurement, and
military personnel costs are funded through annual
appropriations. On the other hand, major procurement and
military construction . . . are funded through "continuing
or no-years appropriations." Research and development is
funded hy a continuing appropriations.
Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, The Sudaet Process
in Navy . October 1959, pp. 2-3r2-4.
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the budget cycle has four f$w@mt preparation <f©radiation)
,
authorisation, execution, and audit: . the cycle officially begins ia the
various services s*hen the service secretaries receive the budget plan and
policy guidelines from the Secretary of Defense, Ehe Secretary of Defense*
s
guidelines are baaed on xeeeoneadfttitma of the Jfeiat Chiefs of Staff,
the Secretaries then provide additional guidance to their Individual services.
the fowaulation phase nowaaily begins with the issuance of
requirement s by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and normally extends over
sparusctsiately 19 months, a. typical budget fonwlation phase for the various
services has its beginning la ftecenber or January of each year, the
formulation of the budget for fiscal year 1957, uhoae execution phase ran
from i July 195$ to 30 June 1957, was initiated in the latter part of
calendar year 1954, or the beginning of 19. .
Budget formulation in the Department of Sefeaae and the individual
service*: in subdivided into four stages, the first stage is devoted to the
preparation of determentai programs. I&c second stage consists of the
preparation of departsaeatal eatgoatee. After the Secretary of Befeaae
issued hie guidelines each of the service controllers issued a ''budget call"
requesting Budgets hased on program objectives, the third stage is the
period in ^sfeieh the budget is review**! by the Secretary of Defease, Bureau
of the Budget* and President £rler !• subs&seiea of the budget to the
Congress utten it convenes in January, the last stag* of im&s&t fonaulatien

14
consists of congressional xevicm. Ifeider itkaal eiraaftstaacea, the Congress
passes all appropriation bills by 30 June, thus authorising the obligation
and caqMaoditures of funds caraoeuciag i July. Bawver, in recent years the
Ctongreau has missee" no appropriation bills by 30 Juno, and under these
eireuja&tanceti the Congress passes a resolution authorising the government
agencies to continue their operations until the pending appropriation bills
are passee'. Figure 2 is a graphical illustration of the budget process.
Hie execution phase covers the period from 1 July through 30 June
of the tbllouring year. Funds become available after appropriation bills
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Frederick C. Kosher in discussing the military performance structure
had this to say:
i * * far * variety of reasons they fall short of the
desideratum of directing the reviewers* attention to the
basic program and policy decisions that the Hoover Commission
and a great many other students feel should be the concern of
the Congress and the Executive. It is true that the
concentration on major components or categories of cost reveals
and points up much information that is basic to intelligent
appraisals the strength and direct costs of military personnel
in the services i the amount or number and the cost of major
items of military procurement, which mm- at least indicative
of military strength* the amount, nature, location, and cost
of military construction; the cost mtd content of medical
activities; the cost and subject matter of research and
development: and others.
But nowhere in the budget presentations of the Department
of Defense does one find an approach to answering the basic
question: how much protection (or how much insurance) are we
buying with this budget? Or, in terms of alternatives, how
much more (or less) protection would we obtain by the addition
(or subtraction) of another billion or ten billion dollars?*
Arthur Smithies states that the performance budget is a marked





the budget is to accomplish* However, the performance budget fails to
answer questions that would arise in evaluating the merits of programs. He
further states,
this budget classification does not reveal the else,
the activities, and the costs of the fleet, of the Strategic
Air Force, or of an army. It does not show how much is to
be spent for combat operations, for the active defense of
the Baited States.
Zt is apparent from the instructions that President Kennedy gave
to Robert £5. McKsmera upon his assumption of office as Secretary of Defense
that he, President Kennedy, was advocating a military budget based on programs*
The instructions which Kr, HcHamara received were:
Develop the force structure necessary to our military
requirements without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings, and
Procure and operate this force at the lowest possible
cost.
Even with the passage of Title IV of the national Security Act
Amendments of 1949, which required a performance*type budget be adopted by the
Department of Defense, the Department still lacked the machinery to review,
analyjse and consolidate the programs developed by the individual services.
^Smithies, p. 234,
2
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Hemorandum for the President,




Each of the services had its own procedure for developing programs to
accomplish assigned mission**. President Eisenhower tried to give the
Secretary of Defense the authority to transfer funds between the services in
the Reorganisation Act of 1956, but was unsuccessful. However, the
Reorganisation act of 1958, did go part way in meeting this requirement by
establishing the unified operational eoraaaads.
The remaining part of the requirement to control the funds of the
Individual services was undertaken in the spring of 1961, when a study was
conducted to classify military activities in terms of missions, and to extend
the planning time to show the effect of programs in future years.
The first formal step to establish this integrated programming/
financial management for the department of Defense came with a directive from
Charles J. Hitch, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Za his
words, the fundamental objective of the new system (Program Change Control
System) is
... to integrate the planning and programing and the
financial management functions in order to provide better
cools for decision-making by the Secretary of Defense and his
military advisors; and to create a planning and programing/
program decision-making and not just geared to the annual
budget cycle. In such a system, not only would budget
decisions be program decisions, as they inevitably era now,
but program decisions would be budget decisions, that is,
decisions to embark on programs «©uld be explicitly decisions
to provide the resources required to carry them out.
.
m l " i « i n h i in ' ii i r m i ii I n u i urn <- m iiik i h ii m h i m ii h ii * m i m i ii .m ii I n ii n
iDej-rt*** ef the B.vy, Office of the Cc^troUer, Pro^ C^aee
Control System iq the Department of t:h© Kaw, mVEXOS P-2416, August, 1962,
pe 1-le

Almost three months to the day after Mr, Hitch issued hid directive
to establish an integrated programming/financial management system for the
to the service secretaries* The purpose of this memorandum was to inform
the Secretaries of the Army, Nevy and the Air Force that he had: directed
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to conduct further studies
in which to improve the planning«prograi3ming*hu4®etin$ procedure in the
Department of Defense.
The purpose of the programming study was to develop a system in
which planning and controlling of major programs could be made at the
highest levels within the Department of Defense. The major objectives of
the programming system provided!
regarding the broad aspects of Defense efforts cannot be based
on the traditional spilt between the Services. . . . Decisions
must recognise the interdependence of the Services and the
possibilities for trade*offs between competing methods of
accomplishing similar missions. . . . The mission-oriented units
of military force constitute the "output" of Defense activity
and. as such. mrv& a$ the prime focus for decision malting.
Each proposed force structure lias Its cost. « . . this cost
must be expressed in dollar terms, since the total sacrifice of
resources required to implement a force structure can best be
gauged by the single measure* dollars. Nevertheless, an
estimate of the t*me~phased requirements for major resources
must also be expressed in terms of physical units. . . , the
Programing System must be capable of providing both financial
and nonfinaneial estimates of the resource inputs required over
time in order to obtain a specified time-phased military output.
Budgets and funding decisions must be compatible with long*
range programming decisions. ... If a need for a revision i&

20
programs is recognised during the budget review? process,
the Programing System roust provide a means for changing
the approved programs in order to achieve compatibility.
*• ^^mifflWftW of pyyaiflm* not. planning
should not be rigidly tied to any arbitrary calendar period.
. i . The Programming System oust provide a means for
continuous review of program decisions and a mechanism for
changing the programs whenever a need for a change ia
recognised* . . .
5. Progress reporting. Control of approved programs
must be exercised through a system of timely reports. , * *
Progrataming System ntust provide a routine capability for
making cost•effectiveness studies of alternative force
structures. Ihe costing techniques used must be accurate
enough to provide a basis for comparing programs, yet at the
same time responsive enough to allow frequent studies of many
alternatives without imposing repeated, burdensome workloads
on BO© personnel*
*« im&fcfa*>,9t osp pfomMm, tow* »•
Programming System imposes rather heavy requirements on the
Services* * * . The Programming System can play a major
role in the development of an integrated DSD management
system*
President Elsenhower had sought in the Ueorganisation Act of 1958* Mr.
HcHsmore has the control over the various service programs which in effect
dictates the ®i»e and make-up of future service organisation*
With control over programs from their inception,
authority to transfer funds during the current fiscal year
ia largely superfluous, since a given year*® budget is
relatively inflexible, having been shaped by decisions made
in previous years. Through the program package approach
2
the Secretary of Defease can control those early decisions.
mmmm
m
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iDepartment of Defense, Sfcudy ifrporfr on the Pro^jpff^m 8mm fyf
frhc Pffj.ee, of .the, Sectary of Mmm* 25 June 1962, pp. I-1-I-3.
'"Barry C. White and Bobevt J. Maasey, "Program Packaging—
Opportunity and Peril," JMfrA fltfflftftf Pm&, Hmtem ft^flWUftMB*
(December, 1961), p. 35,
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In the nev military contest, programing is the planniag and
controlling the allocation of resources to accomplish specific military
outputs, thee* allocations of resources md military output are known as
"program elements" and "material items. !{ This system is concerned with
comparing alternate methods, by their costs, their effectiveness, and their
t
feasibility in accomplishing specific aisslons.
Captain White and Lieutenant Coeviander Meesey stated that
the program approach facilitates "rational tradeoffs"
by identifying the various systems, measuring the cost of all
the "inputs," and measuring or estimating the "output" or
contribution they make toward the achievement of our security
objectives. 2
As defined by the Department of Defense, a "program element" is an
integrated activity, a combination of men, equipment and facilities uhieh
together constitute an identifiable military capability or support activity.
To further explain «hat is meant by "program elements," the following remark
by Kr. Hitch, in his testimony before the Subeoramitfcee on Jlatioual Policy
Machinery of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, is helpful, lie
stated that program elements consist of "such forces as B*52 vlnga, infantry
«—
—
mmmmnmim—«——»— nu ll mm—mmMfw^m—*******—* M i i « iii. iiiii hii II . i n ' » 11— »—«mww«<—»«—>w> 11 i H im i»i—«— m i « »ii»«i»»«i«w«—»—
^Department of Befenae, S^y
.ftnmft, en, the groma4nfi System, ,f,oy
*tihite and llassey, p. 27*
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battalions* and combatant ships, taken together -..1th all the equlpr.ient, oca,
installations, supplies, and support rehired to make- them effective
military force*."1
these program elements ate then grouped int« a program (formerly
program package) based on a cosaaou mission or set of purposes* Shis inter*
they support each other or are a close substitute for each other, the
Department of Defense has been organised Into nine programs, as follows:
Frogrea I - ^frWeflJ^, JMHaMffifQIT F<fflfi» Nl program includes a
number o£ categories which include land based aircraft, land and sea based
missiles; command, control, and communication as well as headquarters and
t^mnftTK* support.
includes such program elements as surface*to*air missiles, early warning
systems, air defense interceptors, etc.
Program 111 - General Purpose forces , this program is the largest
of all the programs and includes the forces required to fight local or
limited wars as well as general engagements. Ml Marine Corps units, most
of the Army's combat units, the levy's combatant ships as well as support
vessels, not including the Polaris submarine, etc.
»«**««w*»<Mw*ii»«iMi«wimiiM«»«»awiw»iw^
^Charles J, Hitch, statement before the Subcommittee on National
24 July mi, p. G.
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«*W|5*aia *.» TQJBfti TV ITWiffi 1 1 fffWn*- tnffCTTnTiWfiran ITniufflfflShmi * ****** |»*,V#gJ*#WM J»tit»J.»tUt,t<
the Air Forces troop carrier wings, the Military Air Transport Service (HATii)
end the Military Sea Transport Service (1$>TS)
.
in each service, the arrangement is according to major missionCs).
ffVQ'gmwm »* • fflBllfflllfffli twii i(ffiWiiiiiwiiy«Tib"jrwwa* ****>» program %nc4uoea *vw
activities not specifically associated with program elements.
Program VII » General Support* this program includes such things as
training, recruiting, medical support, etc.—activities which cannot be
associated with specific missions, systems* etc.
Program IX - ^,U«Y t¥MEMl» ,PTO»»
Uithin the Department of Defense, "'resource inputs 5 ' are expressed in
fc*^^a>atwpi ^Br^s ^t*Wtw*^^* wi^BwWwwa ^•^••^ j »s»*e^w ^w<^>'Tiir w^via^ v •af*»w*s»*T* •n^w^»*r «*wr^P" s*,js ij^^**i^ a ^•aflM»w*a''e<^s wssmwif
homoaeneous. As with program elements, categories must he grouped in such
a way to he usable by top^mana®sment for decision-oaking, while at the
time eliminating unnecessary detail* Sesource categories are measured in
financial and noufinaucial terms when possible*
Ute sum of all program elements constitutes the total
military output and the sum of all resource categories
equals the total resource Input to Defense programs. Thus,
the two dimensions of plaimlng—the Input end output
<Slflttiision--4aexely provide different "slices*' of the same basic

24
overall DOB program* neither diiaenaion alone gives sufficient
information for all CkSD planning and control; both taken
together provide a complete picture of the sources and uses of
resources among the various Defense activities, 1
The relating of program elements to resource categories is a two
stage process
s
1. Establislsaeat of gross resource requlrcaaents j
2. Determining new requirements for resources and acquisition plan.
The initial step in gross resource planning Is the deteraination of the
total gross requirement s> of resource categories for each program eloaent.^
This is illustrated in Figure 3.
The next step Is to develop a schedule to show the gross resources
which vili be required over a period of time to support a given program.
If tiie resources are not available trithln the Department of defense then
i('^N^H^a*iP ws*#bw •» w#^Hr pMM^iMAfii Sf^'a* ^n*^*^t-%a<afca>' wi>asflai •a*a*^ a^^Hwwppia^w^aifaaHjfc *wssnitf* %ifc,4» ^p™>e^*«t^» afc^weaNa^t a* %^fl^*^^*a» ***^i*<!f •
Figure 4 is a continuation of Figure 3, and gives a summation of the planning
for acquiring the new re^uirssaents. 3r
^Department of Defense, Study Report of the Programing System for
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 25 June 1962, pp. XX-1 to XI-5.
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Detailed planning is primarily concerned with nosnfluaucial items;
however, the purpose of planning la to determine the east of force structure
over a period of time, the common denominator used to determine resource
cost la the dollar. Cocta can he related to resource categoric;* because ail
resources acquired have a coot figure. Onca the cost of resource categories
la determined, than other costs can be determined, such as cost by program
elements.
top management makes its major program decisions. In order to determine the
cost of these decisions, it is necessary to know the cost of the program
determine what it costs the Department of Defense to perform its various
missions. However, the usefulness of program element cost is limited by the
problems encountered in allocating resource input costs to program elements.
The major problem encountered is proportioning the cost of an activity which
'supports more than one program element.*-
Kr, Hitch, in his book, Tftff fWMfaB ffifi Mmm U tiffi Mtffiffi &M>




defense needs. Son* feel that defence needs should be considered only on the
needs within a specified budget figure. - The other group feels that defense
requirements should be based on needs alone, This feeling vas brought out in
hearings before the subcommittee of the Coaoittce on Appropriations Then
Senator Chaves told General Hexvell D. Taylor, ••Wa would like to know what
i
you need and not what the Budget Bureau thinks yon should have."
plans on the basis of either cost alone or needs alone, after* is no budget
else or cost that is correct regardless of the payoff, and there is no xx^i
Z
that should be met regardless of cost." Xn speaking before the Annual
National Conference of the Aimed Forces Kaaagesacnt Association, Mr. Hitch
stated)
She financial management system xaust serve many other
purposes. Certainly, it oust produce a budget in a form
acceptable to Congress. It must account for funds in the
same manner in which they are appropriated. It must provide
to managers at all levels in the Defense establishment, the
financial information they need to do their particular jobs
in an efficient and economical nanner. It must produce the
financial information required by other agencies of the
Govempent«*Bureau of the Budget, the treasury and Govermaeat
Accounting Office.
nimn »n» in i i» m
Ttepartiaent of Defense Appropriations for 1937* fla&rio&fi
2nd Session (Washiagtoa, $» C.s u* 8« ©ever
^Wi, Bf.„S,i Scaa^e, SfttU Congrea** 9
>rameat Printing Office, l95o), p. 93*







But all this is not enough. The financial management
system must also be made to provide the data needed by top
Defense management to make the really crucial decisions,
particularly on the major forces and weapons systems needed
to carry out the principal missions of the Defense
establishment. These decisions cannot be made rationally
without an adequate knowledge of available alternatives,, in
terms of their military worth in relation to their cost*
The program system is designed to supply data for cost-effectiveness
studies. In other words, the system is designed to achieve an overall
military effectiveness, from the large but not unlimited resources. "This
requires that a methodical examination be made of alternative ways of
accomplishing desirable military missions in order to select those weapons
2
and forces which provide the greatest return for the defense dollar."
CfraqfifoK Approved Programs
Unforeseen circumstances and/or events both political and economical,
both here at home and abroad, may cause a change to an already approved
program. Changes may also be initiated as a result of a reevaluation of a
program by the implementing service, or changes may occur as a result of
revisions to the proposed budget as it passes the various review stages,
commencing with the Individual service review and terminating with the
^Charles J. Hitch, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) before
the Annual national Conference of the Armed Forces Management Association,
Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C. , 1 March 1961.
2Department of Defense, Study Report on the Programming System for the




The service responsible for the program is responsible for initiating
the change proposal to the Secretary of Defease when It its desired to make
authority (20A) "threshold* for either the current budget fiscal year or
the total cost to the latest approved "Five-year Force Structure and
Financial Program. " Date this axraaggpenfent the Secretary of Befense ia able
to supervise the "Program Outage Control System" by use of the exception
rule and focu© hie attention on new program proposals. Changes which do not
exceed the established "threahelae" are made by the service secretaries.
Once the proposed change is approved it io the approved change that
is controlled, rather than the initial proposal, this eontrol should be
such that it can be directly related to the approved proposal. Ibis is
required in order to insure that actual results attained are in accordance
with the approved program; in other words, perfoimsnce results must be
reported in terms of program elements and resource categories. Control of
easts is exercised through resource categorise, while program elements are
I
used to evaluate physical performance.
In order that the ftill &apact of programs can be analysed, the
Office of the Secretary of defense requires that program element cost be
'
" » » iiii«iw<»«——WW——« < «ii ] .l»« i'»«i»H »ii m im'ii1ll»i .H I U i » in.|i | ilill»—
»
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. , pp. 11-12-11-13.
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sutaiLtcd to cover a five year period* and in addition that this, cost be
a
1, total obligations! authority £K&);
3, categories of costs.
The forawiatioa and review phase of pxegroaa is followed toy the
preparation of the budget in terns of progress and in terms of appropriations,
The budget is prepared in terns of prograias so that military activities can
be classifted in terms of their niaaioas—thus placing the caaphasis on
military niosions rather than on the individual service, plus giving the
Congress and the American people some "rough" answers to efuestions they have
been asking for years—question© like, ha*? ouch does it cost to defend the
United States frora surprise attacfc, or hov such does it east to maintain a
strategic retaliatory force?
Figure 5 depicts the Bepermsnt of the Navy budget in terms of
progress,
aumn— i.iin n» niii m i ' i ii i * m i mn h i ii in » im iinwi m i n n i n i mm Hiiiiii iim iimn iimnuiM mi— . » » i in inn i n mu iiiin»lii, l inni i n mm mi mi
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Department o£ the Bevy
The Budget by Program, FT 1$63
(in HUlioa© of Dollar®)*
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Program Amount
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X Strategic Retaliatory Forces §2*034,3
IX Continental Mr and Manila Defease Forces 135,3
XIX General Purpose Force* 3,392,2
XV Sealift/Mrlift Forces 43,0
V Jteserve and Guard Forces 347,3
VI Saseerch and Developtaent 1,169,9
VII General Support 3.336.3.
Total Obligatiooal Authority $15,363,1
»Dapart©ent of the Bevy, m&m^WMm, frWfiEfl ftr*m *M IftP
mmmm, ^ tiltt IRffy* KMTCXGS P-2416, August, 1S62, p. 2-12.
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The Department of the Navy had no dollar® in Programs fill and IX,
For purpose of comparison, the sane budget la shown in Figure 6 on
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BUDGET F02M0LATIOH XH NOT
rgmflWHrJrrrr
Before budget formulation—cornea the establishment of objective®.
In order for the Havy Department to establish objectives which ere consistent
with national objectives end goals, it nut receive guidance from higher
authority* Once these guidelines are received then the Navy must further
amplify then and prepare detailed objectives.
Guidance and direction is received from two sources: the highest
executive level—the President, and the Secretary of Defense. The guidance
furnished by these authorities has been described as follow:
In providing guidance to the Secretary of Defense* the
President, of course, relies heavily for advice on his
Immediate staff agencies and other groups established to
assist in the formulation of policy. Asaong the more fcsportaat
these for budget purposes are the Bureau of the Budget, the
Council of Economic Advisors, and the National Security Council.
Presidential guidance, which usually covers bread areas
such as fiscal policy, economic assumptions; and the general
level of the military effort, is usually transmitted to the




President' a immediate staff office charged vlth
responsibility for development of the budget of the
United State© Govenweat,
Th«i Secretary of Defense, in turn, provides military
and fiscal guidance to the Navy. Based on the recosraendations
of the Joint Chiefs of ^taff , for example, he provides the
Navy with approved military programs such as force levels and
personnel strength. In addition, he provides the fiscal ground
rules to be followed la preparing the budget.
The amount of direction and guidance received from higher
levels varies from year to year depending on many consider*
ations such as the international situation, the economic
outlook, and changes in administration. Very often, guidance
is received piecemeal during the budget formulation period—
rather than at the beginning when, from an Ideal viewpoint,
it is most needed.*
liic Department of the $avy realises that the field of budgeting la
complicated and is ever changing. Hiesc changes and complications are not
caused by the personnel engaged In budgeting but major decisions which are
affected by technological advancements, international situations, economic
considerations, etc, which are beyond the control of the Navy.
the budget cycle formally commences in the Havy after the Secretary
of the Havy receives the policy guidelines and budget plana from the
Secretary of defease. £b»ever, limited informal guidance, such as
contemplated force levels and military strengths, are Issued by the
Secretary of the Havy for preliminary planning purposes, This guidance is
HI i«w.ilii|l H iiimii»»»i(^im»»»»«II«MWIII«WMW»I»»»»WMW»»«i»«»»*»M»^ II I .H U l |M»«|||—
^Department of the Uavy> Office of the Comptroller,
October, 1933, pp. 3-l*>2,
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normally Issued In the beginning of December, nineteen months in advance of
the budget year.
The next step taken within the Department of the Navy, based on the
policy guidelines and budget plans received, is the development of the
annual program objectives by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant
of the Marine Corps, under the general direction of the Secretary of the
Navy.
The program objectives are the basis on which the annual budget
estimates are based. The program objectives are primarily concerned with
the accomplishment of the missions of the Navy. The program objectives
are "... expressions of reasonably attainable goals which are planned
2for accomplishment during a particular fiscal year."
In other words, program objectives contain the
increments of major programs which are feasible of
accomplishment during a year. In addition, the program
objectives set forth for the budget year the proposed:
1. Personnel strength and force levels.
2. State of training and degree of readiness to be
attained.
3. Deployment of major units.
4. Annual increment of mobilisation requirements.
5. Policies on procurement, mobilisation, personnel,
and other areas.'
Ibid
. , p. 2-6.
department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Financial
Management in the Navy , NAVPE&S 10792-A, 1952, p. 48.
3Ibid . . p. 48.
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Program objectives are veil thought out* detailed pleas that have
been under consideration end developsaenfc for many sxmthe sad la ssome cases
years. Programs prescribed and recojoaeaded by the Secretary of the 8evy,
the Chief of tfeval Operations* the Cktftaandant of the tferine Corps* program
sponsors, mi bureaus and offices in addition to the annual incxement from
the projected program objectives provide the base for the selection of
programs for a specific year.
Ihe responsibility for coordinating the preparation of progress
objectives rests with the Assistant Chief of Havel Operations (ACDO),
General Planning. From the guidance he has received, the MM) forwards the
program objectives, personnel strength, degree of readiness, assumptions, and
other policy guidelines to the various program sponsors and program
coordinators in the Havy.
Program sponsors are the six Deputy Chiefs of Havel Operations,
assistant Chief of SJsval Operations, Intelligence and CoOTunieatioaa, the
Ceoaandsnt of the Marine Corps and the Ckiaf of Baval Material, the
Assistant Chief of ftaval Operations, Intelligence and Comcmmications has
just recently been added as a program sponsor. Toe program sponsors
exercise authority and responsibility over all naval programs, the staff
level planners are representatives of the program sponsors and are permanent
working groups, the program coordinators are responsible to collect,
»!' ' I w ii i n Mm » i» i I i I li nn. I ii i ii » « » .M ini ii in m m i ii rii iH Uiw n i .mi .mm 1 1 i n nwniw—«w»—
—
*2£esesreh Report of the 1961 Class Navy Graduate Comptrellorship
.w^jrwa, fiSfeiTi" irraKriB ira iHifiiwwwB%TB iw»i iiffl™ft i JfiiiiwWpffi iiilOTfiii iiiwwWffflarSiHfT iiii fl« nW i Pr i>M^aiCT»iiH8Mffiiii ttr
the, Haw. !&*e Oeer®» Washington tJaivereity, Washington, X>. C, pp. 27-28.
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coordinate and submit to the ACNO, General Planning, the information to be
included in the Program Objectives*
From the information received the ACWO (General Planning)
prepares a draft of the program objectives. This involves
adjusting, tailoring, and balancing programs to ensure that
the Program Objectives will:
(1) Conform to any military and fiscal guidelines
received;
(2) Ensure a well-balanced naval establishment;
(3) Provide guidance for attaining an adequate mobilise*
tloa base; and
(4) Provide sufficient information for program and budget
personnel to develop detailed requirements and budget
estimates.
The process of tailoring and fitting programs requires
a steady flow of information between program coordinators
to ensure that as one program is modified, associated programs
are altered to fit* 1
The tailoring and fitting of programs result in a draft of program
objectives which is submitted to the Office of the Comptroller for review
and development of a rough price-out of the program objectives to assist
in a determination if the cost is in a reasonably attainable range.
The proposed program objectives with their estimated costs are
submitted to the CHD Advisory Board (CAB) for review. The Board studies
each program and resolves existing controversies. CAB then submits the
annual Program Objectives to the Chief of Iteval Operations for his
consideration and approval. The Commandant of the Marine Corps reviews
| « iii»i WWmiii>i* mull ii I* H' l.i M« IW1K.OWMW im i, i»M 'I n w— H i i——— '—« ' m i (H i *—*— nil ( mi —I I. «—
Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, The Budget
process in Navy , October, 1959, p. 3-4.
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program elements of Marine- Corps Interest* the next step in establishing
program objectives Is review and approval by the Secretary of the Havy.
However, since the incorporation of the Program Change Control System, the
programs must also 'be submitted to the Secretary of Defense for his
consideration and formal approval.
budget, tan Military Separtments will develop the required
budgetary request documentation from the program for the
budget year of the 5~year plan. Except in unusual
latum*. MM programs will not be introduced in the
presentation of the budget, and financial envelopes or
time of the budget call. The budget merely will provide
a perspective from an appropriation and budget activity
point of view for programs which have already been approved
and whose total tentative financial s*^n£remeata arc known
through the updated version of the "Five Year Force Structure
and Financial Program*
la the past* the Neva! establishment was required to submit an
estiaaate of budget axpaaditures which would be required to continue its
programs for a year succeeding the budget year* Under the Program Chang*
Control Syataat, costs &m projected five years into the future, while force
structures are projected eight years into- the future. These figures
include all costs, not just the cost of the hardware, but costs for military
personnel and other items necessary to make the program element an
«—— i» p . i »i ii I Iw—p»iw» 1 1 in imm i i iw m i m niw nn—mww ii mn i m—mmm»—«fc—<iw iiiii ) iwwmwwii im n ih—wm— »» iii
^Oepartment of the Hfrvy, Office of the Comptroller, yrofflCj





Under the old method, when at various times the Naval establishment
developed new programs, they were submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
for approval* These approved programs served as the basis for the
Secretary of Defense guidance in the preparation of the budget. Under the
new method, the uFiva-Year Force Structure and Financial Program" serves
as the approved base plan and approved programs are not resubmitted each
year for approval. But as previously stated* changes to approved
programs may be submitted at any time; however, the latest approved program
2
remains continuously in force,
Before funds are finally appropriated by Congress, the budget for
reviews within the department of the Kavy is to determine the amount
required to carry out the missions of the Kevy as expressed by the approved
programs. In the mtm& a celling or target is set hy higher authority,
te and Hassey, p. 32.




then the review should strive to develop the beet programs within the
established fund iiaitatians. Under the Program Change Control System no
fund ceiling or target as such has been established. As can be seen from
the above discussion, review plays an important role in budget forcsulatlon
in Bavy.
Beside detemiains the funde rehired to carry out the missions of
the navy, budget review has other objectives, depending on the level of
review* For exanple, at the bureau level, the review process seeks to
cognisance, to activities' under particular bureau control, labile at the
CEO level a secondary objective of review is to resolve differences between
bureaus in order to arrive at proper balance of resources required to
aceosjplish the objectives. Final review within levy is conducted at the
Secretary of the Navy level, Differences tisaong prograras are resolved at
this level prior to the budget being forwarded to the Secretary of
Defense.
fhflftntf* fteview ****><« the Jlaw BenartaentJWWHHn»Hr ii i irffl it iw iWBr irw iii. i - 11 nT! inwi iirT i iJM i BrT i CTH i mJ ii AnmWULBXMISO^
the formal review of the budget for the I^partiaent of the Havy
arts in the Office of the Comptroller* the E&VC&1PT review has several
purposes, but primarily it is to develop an overall budget for consideration
mm .i n ii ii m i i nnnm unmm i h 11 i i in ii nm ii«»«>im,m ii i mum n .mii m n khii «.» klu. i i h» i n» i» > ni i niwm i in i» nim"
^Seoearch laport of the 1961 Class Havy Graduate Coe^trollership
ub*^"» Etf*Jk&MtwR&*&- .iwUwja^'ftt*SK ,a»fel. ,#fiImfMr34*fi! *>Bj>qBay^^yM» .AU. .LUC, ftlBaW^QaCllp v*
tfte Itew. The George feaahiagfcau University, Haahington, D. C. , pp. 43-44; and
Department of the Havy, Bureau of Haval Personnel, FinancJ
the Haw. HfcVPESS 10792-A, 1962, pp. 49-50.
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by the CUD Advisory Board and the top officials of the Navy.
More specifically, central review is undertaken to
insure i
(1) that the budget request conforms with the program
objectives}
(2) that the fiscal policies and guidelines received from
higher authorities have been applied in developing the budget
j
(3) that the pricing of programs is reasonable and that
the programs appear feasible of attainment in the budget year;
(4) that interdependent parts of the budget appear to be
in phase and balance; and
(5) that in areas where the program objectives m:e not
specific or sufficiently clear, the bureaus and program
sponsors are in agreement with respect to the sise and scope
of the program as well as the segment to be included in the
budget.
Figure 7 shows the review process that took place in the Navy for
fiscal year 1964. On 7 July 1963, the Secretary of Defease approved the
base program. Also during July and the first part of August the bureaus
updated and corrected data relating to the cost of the various programs
and elements for fiscal year 1963, as well as for fiscal years 1963-1968.
Also during July the bureaus generated changes which were reviewed during
the latter part of July by the program sponsors. On 1 August 1963, the
changes generated by the General Purpose Study and Service were submitted
to the Secretary of Defense for decision. Upon receipt of the Secretary's
decisions on the submitted changes, the approved changes were incorporated
by the bureaus. Simultaneously with the incorporation of the approved
i
Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, Hie Budget












changes the preliminary review in 14WC0HPI began about the middle of August
when the bureaus, offices end Headquarters, Marine Corp© submitted their
estimates mad ended in the beginning of September after weeks of hearings
and discussions, both formal vod informal with the Navy Comptroller, this
preliminary review is somewhat governed by guidance issued by higher
authority* In numerous cases, this review attempts to determine the method
used in arriving at the dollar figures submitted. For example, the review
seeked to determine if the estimates were based en projecting the prior
year's dollars or whether it Is an honest attempt in terms of known and
jointly modified projected needs*
After this preliminary review, the Comptroller's staff prepared
a ""mark-up*' based on the information determined at these hearings and the
revised budget is further evaluated in terms of objectives of the review.
Hben the "mark-up'' was completed it was sent to the bureaus and offices of
the Havy and. Marine Corps, these proposed revisions-, if rejected, became
the basis for reclame hearings. At the completion of the reclame hearings,
the budget was adjusted to reflect the agreements reached at those hearings,
the "marked-up" budget was then submitted to the cm Advisory Board, the
Chief of Saval Operations, the Commandant of the Karine Corps wa& ultimately
to the Secretary of the Havy for review and approval. On 1 October 1963,
the Department of the Havy budget estimate for fiscal year 1964 was
submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for review.
n "" «ii » m i " i i —«—m»mmmmmmmm—trmmwi i ii nm i» i n 11 1 1 i
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Prior to the Progr*a Change Control System, the Ifevy'a budget was
theoretically divided among its approved programs, and as long as the Navy
regained within its budget ceiling, it was relatively free to increase its
effort in one program providing it made corresponding reductions in other
program(s). This meant that if the Navy decided to increase its carrier
strike force it would have to make compensatory reductions in other sectors
such as Solaris* anti-submarine warfare, or some other unrelated field.
Under the old system, it was extremely difficult to make effective trade-offs
when the overall defense effort was considered. It was impossible to
determine if the country would benefit by these tradeoffs among the programs.
With the Program Change Control System in effect, program changes
are now made within the context of the Program Change Control System, which
corresponds to missions required to defend the Unite*! States and carrying
out its policies, rather than the missions assigned to any individual
service* the Secretary of Defense now divides the resources among all the
programs in such a way to assure a mexixmaa program capability. If the
decision is made to place more resources into the Titan missile program,
then ccrapensatory reductions are made in program elements of the Strategic
Retaliatory Forces Program, such as, Polaris, Atlas, B-52, etc. Under the
Program Change Control System, the Secretary of Defense can now males critical
decisions hamd on relative cost and effectiveness.
'i n " I m > i —mmm-mmt i m i i i i n i n i i n . .iwiii i hi ii i n ] ii in—mmtmrnm—— i I - mi— iwwwmmtmn i . 111 m mmammmmm»
*«hite and Maaaey, pp. 24*25.

% until the tixm the Navy Department budget is submitted
to the Secretary of Defease the review process of budget-aaaklng
is en internal . self•eaataiaation process designee! to produce
a balanced naval progress in support of £he planning objectives.
From the Navy Bcpartraeni * s standpoint , the budget consideration
by the Secretary of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, the
President and Congress should not be thought of in terns of a
review* It is* In fact, a "selling" Job* the competition for
dollars within Che Department of defense is e&tresaely keen.
«»—
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Research leporc of the 1%1 Class Itevy Graduate Comptrollership
,the $evy« the George Haehiagton university, Washington, D* C. , 1961, p. 41.

AH Amursis car we, vaoasm o&hge cohtrol ixsnm
Since the establishment of the First Soever Comaission there have
been numerous suggestions for improving; govaraaettt's decision-making process
by making greater use of those technique® found in business. It must he
realised at this point that there axe many business management techniques
which are not appropriate for use in government. However, the basic
financial planning of government and business ere similar in that both are
primarily concerned vith the problem of effective resource allocations in
accomplishing their respective objectives.
Because of the appropriation system found in government, it is
often thought that financial planning in governexaat ana business are
completely unrelated, this is not so, because the problems which are
considered characteristic of the appropriation system of government are
also found in business. Any decision-maker, whether he be in government
or business, who requires the approval of higher authority for his financial





Xn business as well as in government, the budget should be used to
relate goals to the resources which are required in attaining them.
Therefore, the budget process in govensaent should be based on programs
,
projects, functions, etc. , and not just a summation of costs for objects,
organisations, procurements, etc.
Budgeting can always be improved in order that better quantitative
information can be brought to bear on policy and for translating policy
goals into quantifiable planning objectives* 1,
the Program Change Control System of the Department of Defense
atteiapts to translate policy goals into quantifiable planning objectives
through its mission-oriented planning-progracEttitig-budgeting system. The
following words were spoken by Hr. Mcftsmara in testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee:
Because of the technical complexity of iaodern*day
weapons, their lengthy period of development, their
tremendous combat power, and their enormous cost, sound
choices of major weapon systems in relation to military
tasks and missions have become the key decisions around
which much else of the Befense Prograa revolves. But the
full cost complications of these decisions, present and
future, cannot be ascertained unless both the program and
their cost are projected over a period of years.
lP. E, KcClemoa, %## ,«f Unfa ijftp <fo
(The RAND Corporation, Paper P-26'95* January, 1963), ^. 1-3.
2Bavid Hovick, 7^FW'ft,$Mm MffflE ftlffjtffllfi <*&* RAND Corporate-,
aesearch Memorandum, 8M-317Q, June, i%2), p. I,
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So that the Secretary of Defense would have suae basis for
determining the magnitude of the present as yell as toe future costs of his
decisions, he institued through the Program Change Control System
requirements that the services estimate the cost of their various program
elements projected out for five-years and the force structure for eight-years.
From a decision-making point of view this was a needed improvement from the
previous method of projecting costs one-year beyond the budget year. It
can he readily seen that with the increasing technical complexity of today's
weapon systems tm& their tremendous cost,, costs est.faa.ted one-year beyond
the budget year was an antiquated system from the present day decision
maker's viewpoint*
the Five-Year Force Structure and the Financial Kanagement Program
gives the Secretary of Defense a greater understanding of the short-range
as well as the long-range effects of his decisions to allocate resource*,
A decision to procure a given quantity of hardware carries
with it an obligation for facilities acquisition and training
of personnel, personnel housing, support equipment $ad a host
of other related items, all of which must he paid for. In
addition, a procurement decision implies a decision to incur
annual recurring costs so long, as the. system remains in the
inventory, A full identification of the timing and cost of
these requirements is essential to a full understanding of
the resource impact of a given decision.
mmmmimmmnmm i mn
ffft* » P» *»•
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She -3KYBQX.T program is an illustration of the advantage of this
information system of projecting coses into the future in determining the
desirability of continuing a specific program in relation to its cost*
effectiveness through the comparison of alternatives. In this program,
the Secretary of Defense vm able to make a decision baaed on the information
supplied by the system—the resources already expended on the. SOTOLT
prograa, the effectiveness realised to a specific point in tine* and an
estimate of costs projected into the future to a point in time when the
program would be completely operational. Based on this information, Mr*
KcNamara was able to stake a decision to discontinue the prog-rasa in favor
of an alternate weapon system based on this coat•effectiveness principle,
thus saving hundreds of millions of dollars,
A more recent illustration of hm Defense Secretary IfeHataara relied
on the Program Change Control System as a source of information for
decision-making, is contained in his selection of the General Dynamics
Corporation over the Boeing Corporation to develop an all-purpose TF3L war-
plane which could he used both by the Navy in carrier operations as well as
by the Air Force for land-based operations, Hr, MclSamara stated,
I decided to select General Byaamics as the development
contractor., since I concluded that it was best qualified to
design the most effective airplane that could be produced
at the least cost, ija the least time, to meet our military
Be added that
It should be unnecessary to add that no other consideration
entered into my judgment.
nil ni < 111 1 ii l i nn mm i
*ffie ^ajshinffion, gpst » March 14, 1963, p. A-«,
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It was ao-t until after World Max II, with the establiahoent of the
Hoover Comission, that the edlitary began to show progress la relation to
the budgetary process. Kwavar* even after the passage of Public l*aw 216,
(Title XV—national Security Aaeadiaanis of 1949) which directed the
Department of Defense to adopt a performance-typo budget $ it took the
services until 1953 to raake the changa-aver.
$om of the accomplishments which took place betwaaa the enactment
of Public Law 216 and the astabllabaent of the present system are aa follows:
1. She Befense budget structure ®aa aira^lIfie4 and rationalised
under five principal titles—Military Personnel; Operations, and fclalntenance
;
Procurenent ; Beaaareh* Bevelopneat, test and Evaluation} and Military
Construct ion;
2. the appropriation accounta wane greatly reduced j
3. Comptroller organisations were established thrmigheat the
Defense Benartisienti and
4* There ^ere established baale patterns for budget program and
accounts.
As a result of the Soviet Union's. successful launching of Sputniks
and increasing evidence of interservic© rivalry, particularly in the field
necessity. This reorganisation haa primarily bean accomplished by Defease
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Secretary McNamara through the existing administrative powers of his office.
Through these powers the Secretary of Defense has reorganised all the
principal offices within the Department of Defense. Xn addition, he
established a new procedure for budget formulation which has as its
objective to supply information to relate the cost-effectiveness of
alternative weapon systems. This new procedure for budget formulation is
the Program Change Control System.
This system is an information system which brings together in a
uniform manner, program elements and cost information on which the
Secretary of Defense can make a selection among the proposed alternatives
based on coat-effectiveness. By grouping the various program elements into
various programs, the Secretary of Defense now knows what alternative
systems are available to perform the various assigned missions now and in
i
the future.
As a result of the placement of program elements into programs
based on the mission to be performed, such as strategic retaliatory forces,
continental .air and missile defense forces, general purpose forces, etc.,
a proper mix of forces can be obtained based on national missions rather
than on the missions assigned to the individual services. With the
centralization of power within the Pentagon, the country now has a
reasonable assurance that its defense posture will be eventually balanced
^Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, Program Change




so that the country will be prepared to sect any eventuality.
Under the old system, the services were allotted a 'slice of the
pie" and the services were relatively free as to how they could allot the
funds among their various programs* Xn addition, the services could shift
funds among their various programs. Individual service programs competed
against each other for funds, such a* carrier strike force coiapeting for
funds against Polaris * amphibious shipbuilding, mine warfare, etc. Under
this system there wasn't the assurance that presently exists that the
blend of the nation's forces are such as to carry out the national policies*
With the establishment of the Program Change Control System, the
Secretary of Defense no longer allots a slice of the pie to each of the
services. Under this system, program elements of one service compete with
program elements of other services; the Navy's Polaris program now has to
compote with other alternates of the other services ixi the Strategic
Retaliatory Forces Program instead of programs within Navy. Xn addition,
this new approach assures greater economy through the elimination of
t
unnecessary duplication of military effort.
How, as a result of the cost-effectiveness approach of the Program
Changs Control System, the Secretary of Defense has a sound basis to answer
Congressional inquiries in relating mis&ions to costs. Xn addition,
Mr* Mc&smara now has a basis on which to answer inquiries as to the effect
^'Defense Budget Acts Unified for the first Time,*'
February 3, 1962, p. 72.
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an increase or decrease of funds will have on the nation's military
effectiveness.
The Program Change Control System should be viewed as a step in the
right direction, with significant laaprovemeats to enhance the deeisioaiaekiag
process in the Department of Oafease. Xt adds flexibility to Defense's
The system will continue to serve many purposes. Budgets will
continue to be developed, justified and executed in accordance with the
desires of the Congress, funds will continue to be accounted for in the
aaae manner in which they are appropriated, the reason that this will not
change in the foreseeable future is not because Congress does not feel this
system is an improvement or that they do not trust the Secretary of Defense,
Decision-makers at all levels will continue to receive the financial
information on which to plan and execute programs. In addition, the system
will continue to supply the information needed by top management to make
decisions between alternatives based on cost-effectiveness.
the question is often raised concerning the future of the Program
Change Control System after Mr, HcHamara leaves as head of the Defense
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Department. The main concern in for the system—whether It will be Able
to survive under the direction of someone else. Mr. HcKmaara lias
demonstrated his outstanding ability to operate the largest business In
the world through strong centralization* Indeed, it will be most difficult
to replace this nan. However, various high ranking officials both in the
military and government who are familiar with the system as well as the
wa<#a wmi«»immmct ^»efc-*t'S» aw *•%«• "*suwa»"^p* •#pasm* ap^rsa%*mipsa m#a^ a#"V*«M«awwa?^'' *#aa e^^mapa*'^ aw^^maww^HW^*^**a(asw
philosophy.

ftfrw is tt®8W$u iHNigfEk $m r^nftflffl^pff.t aad iHitJgetiiary literature
have. It {special xaaooing %$&&n uaa4 in, cotw^cti^M. with tib& FvogsWBi *%pffigift
CootJ.p&3. SyitMBU 3&M& tfeaa© &&%%&•& aiea u&&4 is t&ls f*ul>li©8.tiQja tlbey hnwe
cjosusfcjcuiji'feloaa aifflftffx A limiting ®£ wtdQit wdULXt&ty c©*iati?uclLi0tt
ottoiects vifcfo defMatiotive infonaatiotu cost
<$gfm HHHf scijeduied djst£$«
coat categiS9n?y A bswad cat^s&^i&atioa ist# %)£tich pssaga?$iB
elaiaaists as© cljp@l£i^> cori?c#|y;m4ifi@ to tfoe
t&3?8© saafel* plt&aa$ lay ttiiich new ^WfqfijKfflff aystec
1KB® iitt^o4isccid| ai88&ly t jreaeareti a&d
dswlofsaaesifc* Xfive&ttacs&t and operatia&s
A aoafc taiwgf^tfy awerlsg «aat »©<$»&£!&& Jswsj^atsd
^ji^ devoiofoefxt gthaae to ix&xo&tce © isbsw
capability iati> o$s0£ati#Qal use. All
JftXitarsr Osnstrisction aimr&fMriatios co©ta
csscept ttoae associate*! witl* dawlofstaisat «ure








A listing of ptocaitusoeat line items, selected
by oSD because of their aise or iraportaaco,
with descriptive information, cast data,
production and delivery schedules and inventory
data*
A coat category covering recurring coats
raquired to operate and naiataln a capability
throughout it© projected life in operational
u$e. Military Fersonnei, Operation and
Maintenance, and recurring Procurement
appropriation costs are included in this
category. SBX&E and Military Construction
appropriation cost© are excluded,
A broad aggregation of program elements based
on a ecjaaoa mission or set of purposes.
within this groupings the program elements
either ooiapleaeat each other or are close
substitutes tidch should be considered together
in. sse&ing major program decisions.
An adjustment in the latest approved ! 'Five-Tear







whenever variances (increases or decreases)
exceed specific thresholds.
An integrated activity* a combination of men,
equipment and facilities Which together
constitute an identifiable military capability
or support activity.
A coat category covering coats primarily
associated with development of a new capability
to the point where it is ready for operational
use and including ctguipmeat (prototypes, teat
vehicles, etc*} required in the development
by 8DSSR appropriations* delated Military
Construction appropriation costs will also ha
included.
A set of criteria which, if met, require a
program change to be submitted for the approval
of the Secretary of Defense.
H*e total financial requirements for a given
program element or Material Annas, item for a
fiscal year's program, including:
a. Unprograsaed obligations! authority.
b, t&tprogramed obligations! authority brought
forward from prior years*
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c. Obligation*! authority reprogracsed torn
d. SeJabufftManttBts usable for the service account
(from inventory mh&M net replaced in kind).
e. Unobligated balances transferred from othov
appropriations.
f Advance funding for SecBef approved pro-am
to be initiated in future years.
*
iii um i< man a »< i i»!ii .»iii»i»»>»»—«»««—»—«—i i mmmmmmmmmMm*m*mm**mm~mm**m+mw\iii\ ui\ iimi*~**»*<i'mmimmMm nin ii m nii w imn i .. m in im
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